The spokes model of nonlocalized spatial competition provides a new analytical tool for di¤erentiated oligopoly and a representation of spatial monopolistic competition.
INTRODUCTION
The study of markets with di¤erentiated products is essential to understanding modern economies. The economics literature on product di¤erentiation originates from the seminal paper of Hotelling (1929) . The Hotelling model considers a market with two stores located symmetrically on a line, called the Main Street. Consumers are uniformly distributed on the line and incur transportation costs to purchase from either store. Even though the two …rms' products are physically identical, they are di¤erentiated to consumers at di¤erent locations due to the transportation costs. The Hotelling model has become a standard tool in oligopoly analysis.
To understand oligopoly interactions under product di¤erentiation, it is important to develop tractable models with more than two …rms. The circle model (Salop, 1979 ) extends the Hotelling model to allow an arbitrary number of di¤erentiated oligopoly …rms, and has proven to be an important tool for analyzing oligopoly markets. In symmetric equilibria of the circle model, price decreases in the number of …rms, approaching the marginal cost as the number of …rms gets large, and there is over-provision of varieties with free entry. Same as the Hotelling formulation, the circle model follows a spatial approach where consumer preferences (or product characteristics) are represented by addresses in a geographical (or characteristic) space. 1 A distinguishing feature of the circle model is that competition is localized, in that a small change in a …rm's price only a¤ects its two neighbors, not the rest of the …rms. A drawback of the circle model is that symmetry requires incumbents to relocate in product space when new …rms enter the market.
Parallel to the development of models of localized competition are models of nonlocalized competition, in the tradition of Chamberlin (1933) . Under nonlocalized competition, each …rm competes against the market, and a price change by one …rm a¤ects all other …rms (more or less) equally. Nonlocalized competition is clearly important for many industries, and is becoming perhaps even more so with the developments of new trading institutions such as the Internet. Studies of product di¤erentiation in the Chamberlinian tradition include the representative consumer model pioneered by Spence (1996) and Dixit and Stiglitz (1977) , and the random utility model exempli…ed by Perlo¤ and Salop (1985) . Following a nonspatial approach, these studies have o¤ered new insights about prices and product varieties in di¤erentiated-product industries. In particular, a market with nonlocalized competition can provide either too few or too many varieties.
The literature on di¤erentiated product competition has focused on formalizing Chamberlin's concept of monopolistic competition by examining free entry equilibria in the limit as the number of competitors becomes arbitrarily large. In monopolistic competition, …rms exercise market power, i.e. set price above marginal cost, while earning zero pro…ts. With free entry into the market, the number of competitors increases either as the size of the market grows larger or as the …xed cost of market competition becomes smaller. Monopolistic competition holds in the limit if, as in Hart (1985a Hart ( , 1985b , consumers care about only a limited number of product varieties, 2 or if the product space is unbounded and available product varieties are never close substitutes. These conditions ensure that, when each …rm is negligibly small in the limiting market, the demand for a …rm's product is not in…nitely elastic. 3 Despite the many important developments in the economics literature on product differentiation, 4 oligopoly competition with product di¤erentiation has not been studied in a spatial model with nonlocalized competition. The spatial approach is attractive for oligopoly analysis, because it is based on a de…nite and easy to visualize physical foundation. In the present paper, we introduce the "spokes model" of non-localized spatial competition as 2 This assumption has been justi…ed by Wolinsky (1986) as arising from consumers'imperfect information about di¤erent brands. 3 In the circle model, when the number of …rms approaches in…nite, the distance between any two …rms approaches zero. In the random utility model of Perlo¤ and Salop, when the random utility of each consumer is bounded, the di¤erence between a consumer's utilities from her …rst and second most preferred brands approaches zero when the number of brands approaches in…nite. In both cases the demand elasticity for each …rm approaches in…nite at the limit. 4 See Eaton and Lipsey (1989) and Anderson et al (1992) for excellent reviews of the literature. a tool for oligopoly analysis. The spokes model extends the classical Hotelling duopoly model to allow for arbitrary numbers of possible product varieties and of …rms, and has the following structure. Starting at the midpoint (center) of a line of unit length, add lines of one-half length to form a radial network of N ( 2) lines (spokes). Each spoke (denoted as l i ) terminates at the center and originates at the other end. There are i = 1; 2; :::; N distinct possible varieties of a product, with variety i located at the origin of spoke i: There are n ( N ) …rms, each producing a single variety (or brand). The brands are physically identical but are di¤erentiated by their di¤erent locations. Consumers are uniformly distributed on the network of spokes. A consumer travels to a …rm in order to purchase the …rm's brand, and incurs transportation costs (or, alternatively, utility losses due to imperfect preference matching). For a consumer located on l i ; brand i is her …rst preferred brand (or local brand), and each of the other N 1 brands is equally likely to be her second preferred brand. The consumer has value v for one unit of either her …rst or second preferred brands, and zero value for additional units or for other brands. The Hotelling model is a special case with N = n = 2: 5
The spokes model is a special case of Hart's (1985a) general model of monopolistic competition, and inherits several attractive features that distinguish it from the circle model of spatial competition (Salop, 1979) . First, the model maintains symmetry between all brands and between all …rms without the need to change the locations of incumbents as new …rms enter the market. Second, each …rm is in direct competition with all other …rms, even though each consumer is only interested in a …xed number of possible varieties. 6 Third, total output in the market is not …xed but depends on equilibrium prices and the num- 5 A variant of the spokes model was initially suggested in Chen and Riordan (2003) , in order to study how downstream market structure mattered for the competitive consequences of vertical integration and exclusive contracts. In that model, …rms observe consumers' locations and deliver goods to consumers at individualized delivery prices; and it is thus not an extension of the standard Hotelling model where consumers'locations are not known. 6 Our assumption that each consumer is only interested in two brands is obviously restrictive and is made mainly for tractability. We shall later discuss a possible motivation for this assumption based on consumers'
imperfect information, as well as possible ways to relax this assumption. ber of …rms. Consequently, the new entry in the spokes model has a market expansion e¤ect. Fourth, the model approximates monopolistic competition in the limit as N ! 1 and n = kN for some …xed 0 < k 1. Hart (1985a Hart ( , 1985b interesting welfare properties of equilibrium in the limit.
Our result that equilibrium price can increase with entry is unusual, 7 and it has the 7 Perlo¤, Suslow, and Sequin (2005) demonstrate a similar result in a spatial model comparing monopoly and duopoly. Other oligopoly models in which price rises with more …rms are based on imperfect consumer information (e.g., Satterthwaite, 1979; Schulz and Stahl, 1996; and Stiglitz, 1987) , or mixed-strategy pricing (e.g., Rosenthal, 1980) . Our result is obtained under perfect information and with pure strategies.
following intuition. In equilibrium, each symmetrically positioned …rm views itself as competing in a number of submarkets. The submarkets are distinguished by whether consumers'…rst and second preferred brands are available. In some submarkets, consumers lack an alternatively available brand and the …rm is e¤ectively a monopolist. In other submarkets, the …rm is a duopolist competing with an alternative brand. A key property of the spokes model is that the price elasticity of demand can be lower in the monopoly submarkets than in duopoly submarkets. 8 Therefore, …rms prefer a lower price in the monopoly submarkets, but, unable to discriminate, settle on a compromise price. The e¤ect of new entry is to convert some monopoly submarkets into duopolies. This changes the compromise, and gives …rms an incentive to raise price. This intuition shows that priceincreasing entry depends on a particular ranking of elasticities across market structures.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the basic model and 
SPOKES MODEL
There are i = 1; 2; :::; N possible varieties of a di¤erentiated product. Each variety (brand)
is represented by a point that is the origin of a line with its length being 1 2 : The other end of the line is called its terminal. For variety i; its associated line is called l i ; and the terminals of all the lines meet at one point, called the center. This forms a radial network of lines (spokes network) connected at the center, and this network represents the preference space.
There are j = 1; 2; :::; n …rms in the market, 2 n N: Firm j is located at the origin of l j and produces variety j with constant marginal cost: For expositional simplicity, this variable production cost is normalized to zero; thus all values in the model are interpreted to be net of production costs. Each …rm produces only one variety and posts a single price.
Firms set prices simultaneously.
Consumers are uniformly distributed on the spokes network, and the total mass of consumers is normalized to unity. A consumer's location (ideal point) on the network is fully characterized by a vector (l i ; x i ); meaning that the consumer is on l i at a distance x i to variety i (the origin of l i ): 9 Since all the other varieties are symmetric, the distance from consumer (l i ; x i ) to any variety i 0 , i 0 6 = i; is 1 2 x i + 1 2 = 1 x i : Any consumer must travel on the spokes to reach any …rm (variety) where she wishes to purchase the product, incurring positive transportation costs: The unit transportation cost, t; is normalized to unity; thus all values in the model are expressed in transportation cost units. Variety i is consumer (l i ; x i ) 0 s …rst preferred brand (or local brand), of which her valuation for one unit is v; she also has a second preferred brand, which is any i 0 6 = i chosen by nature with probability 1 N 1; and of which her valuation for one unit is also v: The consumer places zero value on the brand that is not one of her two desired brands, 10 as well as on any additional units of any brand.
We notice immediately the following:
Remark 1 The spokes model reduces to the Hotelling model when N = n = 2:
We derive the demand for …rm j for any given price pro…le (p 1 ; p 2 ; :::; p n ): There are three relevant categories of consumers: consumers for whom brand j is preferred, and whose two preferred brands are both available; consumers for whom brand j is the …rst preferred 9 We denote the consumer located at the center by l1; 1 2 ; and therefore every consumer's location representation is unique. 1 0 We discuss later about the motivation for this assumption and how it can be relaxed without changing the results of our analysis.
brand, whose second preferred brand is not available; and consumers whose …rst brand is unavailable and for whom brand j is the second preferred brand.
For any consumer located on l j or on l k ; denoted as (l j ; x j ) or (l k ; x k ); for j; k 2 f1; :::; ng;
both variety j and variety k are her desired brands with conditional probability 1 N 1 : Such a consumer is indi¤erent between variety j and k if p j + x j = p k + (1 x j ) or p j + (1 x k ) = p k + x k . The marginal consumer between j and k is a distancê
The number of such consumers served by …rm j is
where 2 N is the density of consumers on l j and on l k : For any consumer on l j; with probability 1 N 1 variety i is her second preferred brand where i = 2 f1; :::; ng: Such a consumer prefers purchasing from …rm j to no purchase if p j + x j v: Firm j 0 s demand from this second category of consumers is
where 2 N is again the density of consumers on l j ; and N n varieties are unavailable. Finally, for any consumer on l i ; i 6 = j and i = 2 f1; :::; ng; variety j is her second preferred brand with probability 1 N 1 : Such a consumer prefers purchasing from …rm j to not purchasing if p j + (1 x i ) v: Firm j 0 s demand from this last consumer type is
Summing up these three categories of consumers, and simplifying, we obtain …rm j 0 s total demand as
which, provided jp k p j j 1 and v p j > 1 2 ; can be re-written as
Thus, …rm j essentially sells to two consumer groups: consumers who have an alternative available, and those who do not. The …rm, however, cannot price discriminate between the two consumer groups.
A restrictive assumption of the spokes model is that each consumer only cares about two possible brands, although the two desired brands di¤er for di¤erent consumers. This is a special case of Hart's (1985) restriction that each consumer cares only about a …xed …nite number of possible varieties. It is a tractable way to introduce nonlocalized competition in a spatial setting. One possible motivation for the assumption, following Wolinsky (1986), is consumers'imperfect information. For instance, if the consumer has perfect information about her local brand but must search to …nd information about any other brand, and if she has zero cost for her …rst search but has a su¢ ciently high cost for any additional search, then she e¤ectively will be interested only in her local brand and another randomly chosen brand even if other brands are also desirable. 11 The purpose of the restriction is to assure the existence of a symmetric pure strategy equilibrium in prices with a minimum of fuss. For example, suppose alternatively that consumer (l i ; x i ) valued equally all varieties other than variety i. Then there would be a discontinuity in …rm i's demand curve that would undermine a pure strategy equilibrium.
There are various ways to extend the model to relax the assumption and still deal with the existence problem. For example, suppose that each consumer has a randomly selected third preferred brand valued at v 3 < v 1, fourth preferred brand valued at v 4 v 3 , and so on. Consumer (l i ; x i ) travels distance (1 x i ) to purchase any of these lower-ranked brands, the same as if she purchases her second preferred brand. This formulation is similar to the model of Deneckere and Rothchild (1992) , except that here the intensity of consumer preferences over di¤erent brands is heterogeneous. If v 3 < p , where p is the equilibrium price, then the consumer only cares about two varieties in equilibrium, and all of our results remain true.
PRICE
Given the symmetry of the model, we focus on symmetric Bertrand-Nash (pure strategy) equilibria in which all …rms set the same price p , serve an equal number of consumers q , and earn the same amount of pro…t = p q (recalling cost is normalized to zero): We assume:
If v > v(N; n), then a symmetric pure strategy equilibrium does not exist; 12 and, if v < 1, then …rms e¤ectively are independent monopolists. The equilibrium price is a continuous function of v; corresponding to four regions of the assumed parameter space. The regions are distinguished by the prevailing pattern of consumer demand, in particular, the extent to which consumers whose desired brands are available actually make a purchase and obtain a positive surplus in equilibrium. We have:
The spokes model has a unique symmetric equilibrium. The equilibrium price is p = 8 > > > > > > < > > > > > > :
The proof of Proposition 1 is in the Appendix. second choice of available brands. Consequently, p depends on n and N , but not on v. In Region II, …rms focus on monopolizing consumers who lack a second choice. All consumers whose desired brands are available again purchase, but the marginal consumer is indi¤erent between purchasing her second desired brand and purchasing nothing. Thus each …rm's demand curve has a kink at p = v 1, which fully extracts the surplus of the marginal consumer, and therefore rises linearly with v. In Region III, …rms sell to both consumers who have a choice (the duopoly submarket) and those who do not (the monopoly submarket). The marginal consumer in the duopoly submarket is indi¤erent between two available varieties and gains a strictly positive surplus, while the marginal consumer in the monopoly submarket is indi¤erent between purchasing her second preferred variety and not purchasing at all. An increase in v motivates each …rm to raise price in order to further exploit consumers in the monopoly submarket, and thus p rises with v: This region has the unusual property that equilibrium demand is more elastic in the monopoly submarket, implying that price increases with entry, as discussed further below. Finally, Region IV corresponds to a di¤erent kind of "kinked" equilibrium. All consumers whose …rst preferred variety is available, and only these consumers, purchase the product, with the marginal consumer indi¤erent between purchasing and not. Again p does not depend on n and N , and increases linearly with v.
[Insert Figure 1 about here]
The e¤ects of market structure on equilibrium prices follow easily from Proposition 1:
A change in market concentration has a mixed e¤ect on price across the regions of the parameter space: it is weakly decreasing in n for v 2 but weakly increasing in n for v < 2. In Region I, where v is high, an increase in n has the familiar e¤ect of lowering equilibrium prices, due to increased competition. For Regions II and IV, where the demand is kinked, p is una¤ected by the small changes in n, due to a discontinuity in the marginal pro…t function. What is most surprising is that p is strictly increasing in n in Region III:
This is very di¤erent from the result in the circle model. While there are other oligopoly models in which price rises with more …rms, these models rely either on imperfect consumer information (e.g., Satterthwaite, 1979; Schulz and Stahl, 1996; and Stiglitz, 1987) or on mixed strategy equilibrium in prices (e.g., Rosenthal, 1980) . Our striking result is obtained under complete information and with pure strategies, and it has a novel economic intuition:
In Region III of parameter values, each …rm continues to sell to two segments of consumers, those it competes for against other …rms (the competitive segment) and those for whom it provides the only desirable variety (the monopoly segment). It turns out, however, that demand is more elastic for the monopoly segment than for the competitive segment.
This property is due to the fact that, as the …rm lowers its price, the marginal consumer in the monopoly segment always has zero surplus from the alternative (not purchasing)
while the marginal consumer in the competitive segment becomes increasingly attracted to the alternative (closer to the competing brands). As the number of …rms becomes higher, the monopoly segment shrinks and the competitive segment expands, reducing the overall demand elasticity. This leads to a higher market price.
It is also interesting that changes in n can change equilibrium prices by changing the nature of the equilibrium, i.e. by shifting the equilibrium from one region to another. For instance, an increase in n can shift the equilibrium from Region II to Region I, decreasing o¤, because it also increases the available product varieties, which has the positive market expansion and matching e¤ects. Generally, an increase in n a¤ects consumers in three ways:
Market expansion e¤ect: An increase in available varieties enables some consumers whose desired brands were previously unavailable to obtain a positive surplus.
Price e¤ect: Depending on the value of v; an increase in n can either reduce, increase or have no e¤ect on equilibrium prices.
Matching e¤ect: Some consumers previously consuming their second choice, are able to consumer their …rst choice.
Equilibrium pro…t is calculated easily from Proposition 1 and equilibrium demand:
The pro…t of each …rm at the unique symmetric equilibrium is:
Furthermore, decreases in n for v 2 (Regions I and II); but may either decrease or
The unusual result that pro…ts can be non-monotonic in the number of …rms is a consequence of price-increasing entry. In Region III, an increase in n raises equilibrium price, but reduces each …rm's output since some consumers switch to purchase from new entrants.
If v is relatively large in Region III, then each …rm sells to most consumers in its monopoly submarkets. Consequently, the …rm experiences a large decrease in output when an increase in n converts some of these submarkets to duopolies, even though price increases, and decreases in n: But if v is relatively small, the output e¤ect dominates when n is small and the price e¤ect dominates when n is large, resulting in a U-shaped curve, as demonstrated with the following example:
Example 1 Assume N = 20 and v = 3 2 . Then, for n < N , Since @ @n = 0 when n = 15: 654; which is the solution to 6n 2 297n + 3179 = 0;
decreases for n 15 and increases for n 16:
VARIETY
The performance of markets under product di¤erentiation depends not only on the equilibrium price, but also on the variety of products available in the market. The spokes model o¤ers an interesting setting to investigate the issue of whether and how the variety provided by the market in equilibrium di¤ers from the socially optimal level. Unlike the circle model, the spokes model has the desirable feature that as the number of …rms increases, the symmetry of the model is maintained without the need to change the locations of the incumbent …rms. In addition, there is a market expansion e¤ect with the entry of new …rms, namely some consumes who were not purchasers before will now consume the product, which is not present in the circle model or in the representative consumer model. Furthermore, the e¤ect of entry or exit on market performance depends on the relationships between v, N , and n ; the equilibrium number of …rms (as determined by …xed cost).
Suppose that there are many identical potential …rms who can enter to produce a brand by incurring a …xed entry cost f > 0. If n …rms enter, then each earns pro…ts (n) as characterized in Corollary 2. In a "free entry equilibrim", there are n active …rms satisfying
We separately consider two cases. Case A corresponds to combined Regions I and II of the parameter space, and Case B to Regions III and IV. For convenience we sometimes treat n as a continuous variable, in which case we use the notation [n] to denote the largest integer smaller than n, and [n] + the smallest integer larger than n.
The reader can skip to Section 5 on monopolistic competition without much loss of continuity. Monopolistic competition provides a simpler framework for evaluating freeentry equilibria, with similar results.
Case
We assume that
The …rst inequality in this assumption ensures that the constraint n N is not binding for the socially optimal number of …rms, and the second inequality ensures that a free-entry equilibrium can support at least two active …rms (see Lemma 1 in the appendix).
By Corollary 2, decreases in n for the relevant parameter space for Case A. Therefore ifñ 2 satis…es
then the unique free-entry equilibrium has
…rms.
In order to characterize the free entry equilibrium further, we need some additional notation. De…nen
Thenn is the critical value of n that divides the parameter space between Region I and II, andf is the corresponding value of f de…ned by the zero pro…t condition at this boundary point. Substitutingn intof ; we obtain
For f N f N , Region I is relevant, and for 1 2 f N < 1 the constraint n N will be binding and hence n = N ; for 1 f N f N the zero pro…t condition is satis…ed at
Similarly, the zero pro…t condition in Region II is satis…ed at
The next proposition, which provides a complete characterization of n and is proved formally in the appendix, establishes that Region I is the relevant region of the parameter space at a free-entry equilibrium for lower values of f , and Region II is relevant for higher values.
Proposition 2
The number of …rms in a free-entry equilibrium is
assuming 2 v v(N; n ).
We next compare the free-entry number of …rms with the number that maximizes social surplus (social welfare), n o . Since 2 v v(N; n ); all consumers whose desired brands are available are served in a free-entry equilibrium. This means that social surplus cannot be increased by changing …rms'prices, and any potential distortion in a market equilibrium comes from the possible distortion in the number of …rms.
Accordingly, we compute the socially optimal number of …rms under the assumption that available brands are allocated to consumers e¢ ciently. With n …rms, consumers on the n spokes receive their most preferred variety, and generate social surplus equal to
where 2 N is the consumer density on each spoke. For consumers on the remaining (N n) spokes, whose …rst preferred variety is unavailable, each consumer is served by each of the n …rms with probability 1 N 1 . Thus, the social surplus from serving all these consumers is
Adding up, the social welfare with n …rms is:
W (n) = (4 (N n) v + 4 (N 1) (v 1) + 3 (n 1)) n 4 (N 1) N f n:
We have:
W 0 (n) = 4v 1 + 4N 8N v 6n + 8nv 4 (N 1) N f and W 00 (n) = (4v 3) 2 (N 1) N < 0:
Thus, ignoring integer constraints, the optimal n solves W 0 (n) = 0, i.e.
We note that n w < N when f N 1 2 : Furthermore, it is straightforward that n w > 1 if v 2 and N 2. If n w happens to be integer, then n o = n w is the socially optimal number of …rms. Otherwise, either n o = [n w ] or n o = [n w ] + by the concavity of W (n).
The following table calculates pairs of (n ; n o ) for various parameter con…gurations. An entry of "X" indicates that either n or n o is less than 2. N v = 2 10, 8 5, 6 X, 4 X, X X, X X, X X, X X, X X, X = v = 3 10, 9 8, 8 7, 7 5, 5 X, 3 X, X X, X X, X X, X
10 v = 4 10, 9 8, 8 7, 7 6, 6 5, 5 4, 3 X, 2 X, X X, X v = 5 10, 9 8, 8 7, 8 6, 7 5, 6 5, 5 4, 4 3, 3 X, 2
N v = 2 15, 12 8, 9 X, X X, X X, X X, X X, X X, X X, X = v = 3 15, 13 13, 11 11, 10 8, 7 X, 4 X, X X, X X, X X, X
15 v = 4 15, 13 13, 12 11, 11 9, 9 8, 7 5, 5 X, 3 X, X X, X v = 5 15, 14 13, 13 11, 12 9, 10 8, 9 7, 6 6, 5 4, 4 2, 3
N v = 2 20, 16 10, 12 X, 8 X, X X, X X, X X, X X, X X, X = v = 3 20, 17 17, 15 15, 13 10, 9 X, 5 X, X X, X X, X X, X 20 v = 4 20, 18 The table has several noteworthy features.
First and foremost, the socially optimal number of …rms can be greater than, equal to, or less than the equilibrium number depending on parameter values.
Second, free entry tends to be excessive when f N is small 14 , and de…cient when f N is large. 15 The entry of an additional …rm has the negative externality of reducing each incumbent …rm's pro…t, but also has the positive externality of increasing consumer surplus through the market expansion and the matching e¤ects. For given N; f N being small or large is the same as f being small or large. Thus, when f is small, the negative externality on pro…ts is more likely to dominate; otherwise, the positive externality from the market expansion and matching e¤ects tends to dominate.
Third, the relationship between n and n o is not monotonic in f N (or in f for …xed N ): It can be readily veri…ed that n 1 n w is U-shaped as f N increases, and n 2 n w 1 4 A su¢ cient condition for n > n o is 1 2N < f 1: 1 5 When f N = 2N 3 N 1 (v 1) ; n2 = 2 but n w > 2 if in addition v < N 2 + 1 8 : Notice that in Table 1 
Case B: 1 v < 2
Case B combines Regions III and IV. Recall from Section 3 that
; and (n) is continuous: Notice that 1 2 + N 1 2N n 1 2 (1; 3 2 ] increases in n and is equal to 3 2 when n = N: Thus, if v 2 [1; 3 2 ); as n increases from 2 to N; it is possible that the relevant region for is …rst in Region III and then in Region IV. If v 3 2 ; the relevant region for is always Region III.
The analysis of free-entry equilibria for this case is complicated by the possibility of multiple equilibria, due to the possibility that is U-shaped in n in Region III. For given f > 0 that is not too large; n is a free-entry equilibrium if it satis…es one of the two conditions below:
( ) is decreasing; and
(n ) f (n + 1) for n < N; or (n ) f for n = N:
2.
(z) = f for some z N and (n) is weakly increasing for n z with n = arg max f (n) f n : z n N g :
Obviously, if (n) is non-monotonic in n; both conditions can potentially be satis…ed by di¤erent values of n .
Since in equilibrium not all consumers are served, the prices in the market equilibrium are not e¢ cient. This complicates the determination of the socially optimal number of varieties; since one needs to consider whether prices are set e¢ ciently (at marginal cost).
Suppose that a social planner sets the price e¢ ciently, then the socially optimal (the …rstbest) number of varieties is the same as before and is n o = [n w ] or [n w ] + ; where n w is given by equation (10) earlier.
Suppose next that the social planner can regulate entry but not …rm prices (i.e., the second-best solution). Then with n …rms, consumers on the n spokes receive their most preferred variety, and generate social surplus equal to
For consumers on the remaining (N n) spokes, whose …rst preferred variety is unavailable, if the parameter values are in Region III, then (v p ) consumers on each of the (N n) spokes is served by each of the n …rms with probability 1 N 1 ; and the social surplus from serving all these consumers is 2n N N n N 1
If, on the other hand, the parameter values are in Region IV, then none of the consumers on the (N n) spokes is served.
Adding up, the second-best social welfare with n …rms is:
The second-best number of varieties is integerñ o that maximizesW (n); andñ o can be computed numerically.
In Table 2 , we list for selected parameter values the equilibrium number of …rms, the …rst-best number of …rms, and the second-best number of …rms, (n ; n o ;ñ o ) : When n can take multiple values, the vector of n is entered. A number that is less than 2 is denoted with "X". The socially optimal number of …rms, whether in the sense of …rst-or second-best, can be greater than, equal to, or less than the equilibrium number depending on parameter values. This can happen whether or not the free entry equilibrium is unique.
Relative to the …rst best, free entry tends to be excessive when f N is small and de…cient when f N is large. This is similar to the result in Case A. Relative to the second best, however, free entry tends to be de…cient except possibly for some intermediate values of f N:
For the same N and f N; as v increases, both n and n o weakly increase, as in Case A; but the second best numberñ o can occasionally decrease, possibly due to the fact that price increases with n in Region III.
If f N is relatively small and/or v is relatively large (close to 2), the second best number of …rms tends to exceed the …rst best number; otherwise the opposite tends to be true. This may be due to the fact that under the second best price is too high and output is too low, which makes it more desirable to correct through more entry if f N is relatively small and/or v is relatively large.
Discussion
Deneckere and Rothschild (1985) suggest that markets tend to provide too many varieties under localized competition but not enough under nonlocalized competition. Our analysis indicates that the relationship between the nature of competition and entry is more complicated. In the spokes model, with nonlocalized competition, both under-and overprovision of product varieties are possible. This can happen for di¤erent parameter values, but sometimes also for the same parameter value due to the multiplicity of equilibria.
Our analysis further sheds light on when free entry is likely to be excessive or de…cient. In both Case A and Case B, compared to the …rst best, free entry tends to be excessive when f N is small and de…cient when f N is large. When entry cost is relatively low and/or postentry pro…t is relatively high (f N is small), the business stealing e¤ect tends to dominate the consumer surplus e¤ect of entry associated with market expansion and improved product matching; and otherwise the business stealing e¤ect tends to be dominated by the consumer surplus e¤ect. Interestingly, de…cient entry can also occur here because there are multiple equilibria and the market becomes "trapped" in a low-level equilibrium. If entry were sequential rather than simultaneous, then a "bandwagon" would eliminate such de…cient entry equilibrium.
MONOPOLISTIC COMPETITION
We consider monopolistic competition with the spokes model by examining the limiting behavior of the market when the number of …rms (n) is large. Since our model involves both N and n, we need to de…ne what we mean by n ! 1: Following Hart (1985) , we assume n = kN , for a …xed parameter k 2 (0; 1], and let N ! 1. We interpret this to mean that, as the number of possible varieties (N ) increases, the …xed costs of market participation (f ) decline appropriately to keep the free entry number of …rms (n) in …xed proportion to N .
In order to apply the results from Proposition 1 and Corollary 2 in this limit, we assume v c Hart (1985a Hart ( , 1985b argues that market power is key condition of true monopolistic competition. The following proposition establishes that, in the limit, as the market becomes unconcentrated, price in the spokes model remains bounded above zero, indicating that …rms retain market power. Therefore, the spokes model provides a spatial representation of monopolistic competition. In fact, the spoke model of monopolistic competition is a special case of Hart's general model (Hart, 1985a) . 
As N ! 1; ! 0: But using Corollary 2, it is straightforward to show that N converges to a positive limit. 
In Regions I, II, and IV, the limiting value of N is decreasing in k. In Region III, however, the limiting value of N is a convex function of k with a minimum at
where K (1) = 0 and K 7 4 = 1: In monopolistic competition the free entry zero-pro…t condition holds exactly at an interior equilibrium value of k, provided that in the limit N decreases in k. If n = kN in equilibrium, then it must be that lim N !1 f ! 0; and
if 0 < k < 1. This is a su¢ cient condition for a monopolistically competitive equilibrium in Regions I, II, and IV, while Region III requires the additional condition that k < K (v) to insure that further entry decreases pro…ts. The model also admits monopolistically competitive equilibria with k = 1 and R(v; k) > lim N !1 f N ; in this case, even monopolistically competitive …rms make positive pro…ts, because there is no "room" in product space for further entry. Our analysis below focuses only on monopolistically competitive equilibria satisfying the zero pro…t condition (14) .
We next use the zero pro…t condition to characterize the welfare properties of monopolistic competition. Recall from Section 4 that, ignoring integer constraints, welfare optimizing number of …rms when available products are distributed e¢ ciently to consumers is
Substituting k w = n w N ;
taking limits, and imposing the zero pro…t condition yields the following comparison of the socially optimal and equilibrium number of …rms in monopolistic competition.
Proposition 4 If = f , n = kN; and N ! 1, then
The proposition is summarized in Figure 2 . The solid lines mark the boundaries of the four regions in (v; k), with "X" indicating regions in which a pure strategy equilibrium does not exist in the limit. The dashed lines divide the space in regions where entry is either de…cient (k w > k) or excessive (k w < k). Clearly, entry can be excessive or de…cient depending on (v; k). The value of k can be interpreted as an indicator of the degree of industry penetration in the market. The higher is k, the greater is product availability, and the greater the fraction of consumers who obtain the good in either monopolistic competition or a socially optimal allocation. In each of the four regions, entry has a business-stealing and a consumer surplus e¤ect. The busines-stealing e¤ect refers to the fact that a part of the pro…ts of a new entrant is at the expense of incumbents, and therefore does not contribute to social welfare. The consumer surplus e¤ect aries from market expansion and improved matching of consumers to possible varieties. Entry is excessive when the business stealing e¤ect dominates the consumer surplus e¤ect, and conversely (Mankiw and Whinston, 1986 ).
[Insert Figure 2 about here] Figure 2 also shows that entry is de…cient in Region I when v is su¢ ciently high and a pure strategy equilibrium exists. In this region, price is independent of v. Consequently, the consumer surplus e¤ect dominates when v is large, and thus entry is de…cient; the opposite is true when v is small. In the other regions, prices increase with v, eroding the consumer surplus e¤ect. Consequently, when k is high in Regions II-IV, the business stealing e¤ect dominates and entry is excessive; when k is small, the business stealing e¤ect is small, and entry is de…cient due to the dominating consumer surplus e¤ect.
We next further compare the number of …rms at the free entry equilibrium and the secondbest outcome in the limit. In a second-best outcome, the social planner can choose entry but not prices. For Regions I and II, the number of …rms is the same at the second-best and the …rst-best outcomes. For Regions III and IV, welfare under the second-best outcome isW (n) de…ned by equation (11) in Section 4. Letting n = kN; N ! 1; and assuming f N ! F , we have:
Let k s denote the second-best level of product variety that maximizes this function. Note, however that F = R(v; k) in a zero-pro…t equilibrium. Therefore, for a given v, we can relate k s to the equilibrium value of k, and compare second-best and equilibrium varieties.
[Insert Figure 3 about here]
A numerical comparison is summarized in Figure 3 , which "blows up" Figure 2 on the re- With free entry, the market may provide either too many or too few varieties, and there can be multiple equilibria in the number of …rms. Finally, when the number of …rms and of potential product varieties both approach in…nity, equilibrium price remains above marginal cost, and thus the spokes model provides a representation of spatial monopolistic competition.
As a tool for oligopoly analysis under nonlocalized competition, appropriate extensions of the spokes model of product di¤erentiation have many possible applications in economics.
For instance, the model provides an attractive framework to study …rms' incentives to o¤er multiple products and the competition between multi-product …rms. In particular, the model can address questions such as how market concentration a¤ects the provision of product varieties by multiproduct …rms, and how horizontal or vertical mergers a¤ect competition and consumers. The spokes model can also be used to study how market structure a¤ects …rms'innovation incentives, for instance, whether a larger …rm or …rms in more concentrated markets have greater incentives to innovate. Furthermore, the spokes model is well suited for analyzing product choices by multiple …rms, if …rm locations on the network are determined endogenously. For some of these applications it would be necessary to modify the symmetric spokes model to introduce asymmetric …rms. [21] Wolinsky, A. 1986. "True Monopolistic Competition as a Result of Imperfect Information."
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APPENDIX
The proofs for Proposition 1 and 2 follow.
Proof of Proposition 1. We consider in turn the four regions of parameter values. For each region, we construct a symmetric equilibrium where the equilibrium price satis…es a unique property that can hold only in the assumed region of parameter values, and any other price can be a symmetric equilibrium only in a di¤erent region of parameter values.
The (symmetric) equilibrium is thus also unique.
Region I: Suppose that for this parameter region a symmetric equilibrium price satis…es v > p + 1:
Then the demand facing …rm j is
for prices p j in the neighborhood of p . The corresponding pro…t of …rm j is j = p j q j ;
and, …rm j 0 s …rst-order condition for pro…t maximization is
Therefore, at a symmetric equilibrium, p = 1 + 2 N 1 n 1 :
It is straightforward that the second-order condition is satis…ed and that p is a local maximum. Firm j 0 s output and pro…t at the proposed equilibrium are q = 2N n 1 (N 1) N ; = (2N n 1) 2 (n 1) (N 1) N :
The requirement that v > p + 1 is satis…ed if and only if v > N 1 n 1 2: Finally, it is necessary to verify that a …rm has no incentive to deviate globally. At the candidate equilibrium, the second-order condition is satis…ed for p j p + 1. Furthermore, for v 1 p j > p + 1; demand is perfectly inelastic and pro…t is increasing in p j , and, for Thus p = 1 + 2 N 1 n 1 is indeed a symmetric equilibrium in Region I, and it is the only symmetric equilibrium with the property that v > p + 1.
Region II : Suppose that for this parameter region a symmetric equilibrium price satis…es p = v 1: Then In other words, the demand for …rm j has a kink at p j = v t:
In order for p = v 1 to be an equilibrium, a slight increase of p j at p should not increase pro…t, i.e. q j + p j @q j @p j = 2 N 1 2
which holds if and only if v 2: Also, a slight decrease of p j at p should not increase pro…t, i.e. q j + p j @q j @p j = 2 N 1 2
which holds if and only if v 2 N 1 n 1 :Therefore p is a local maximum. To show that p is also globally optimal, it su¢ ces if …rm j cannot bene…t from any deviation to p j < v 1: But since the second-order condition is satis…ed for p j < v 1 (any kink of the pro…t function makes it more concave); no global deviation can be pro…table.
Thus p = v 1 is indeed a symmetric equilibrium in Region II.
Region III : Suppose that the symmetric equilibrium price p is such that or p = 2 (N n) v + (n 1) 4N 3n 1 ;
and p is a local maximum since the second order condition is satis…ed at p . Furthermore, since v p = v n 1 4N 3n and v p = v 2 (N n) v + (n 1) 4N 3n 1 = v (2N n 1) (n 1) 4N 3n 1 < 2 (2N n 1) (n 1) 4N 3n 1 = 1;
p indeed satis…es 1 2 < v p < 1: Finally, to verify that p is also globally optimal, notice that, since v 1 < p < v 1 2 ; it su¢ ces if any deviation to any p < p cannot be pro…table. But since the second-order condition is satis…ed for p < p ; no global deviation can be pro…table. Thus p is indeed a symmetric equilibrium in Region III. which holds if and only if v 1 2 + N 1 2N n 1 :Therefore, p is a local optimum for …rm j; and, since the second-order condition is satis…ed for both p < v 1 2 and p > v 1 2 ; it is also a global optimum.
To prove that the equilibrium is unique, suppose that there is another symmetric equilibrium,p; in some region, say Region I. Then v p + 1: If v p = 1; thenp can be a symmetric equilibrium only in Region II; if 1 2 < v p < 1; thenp can be a symmetric equilibrium only in Region III; and if 1 2 = v p; thenp can be a symmetric equilibrium only in Region IV. This is a contradiction. Thus there is no other symmetric equilibrium in Region I. The arguments for the other regions are similar. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 2. We …rst establish the following lemma:
Lemma 1 Assume 2 v v(N; n ). Then (i) n 1 2 and n 2 2; (ii) if f N 1; then n 1 N and n 2 N ; and (iii) if 1 < f N; then n 1 < N:
Proof. (i) First, since 1 2 < f N Q.E.D.
Note thatf N = 2(v 1) 2 v 1. We can now provide a complete characterization of the equilibrium number(s) of …rms. First, if 1 2 < f N 1; then n 1 = n 2 = N from Part (ii) of Lemma 1: Thus n = N …rms will enter the market and earn non-negative pro…ts. This is the only equilibrium since no additional …rm can enter due to the constraint that n N:
Next, if 1 N < f f ; we have n 1 n and thus 2 N 1 n 1 1 v:
Therefore n = [n 1 ] ; and, n 1 < N from part (iii) of Lemma 1. Finally, if f >f ; we have n 2 <n and thus 2 N 1 n 2 1 > v:
Therefore n = [n 2 ] ; and n 2 < N since otherwise we would have 2 > v; a contradiction.
Q.E.D. 
